Meaningful Innovation: Ethnographic Potential in the Startup and Venture Capital Spheres

Share Share Share Share Share
[s2If !is_user_logged_in()] [/s2If] [s2If is_user_logged_in()]

Infusing Meaning to Find New Paths

The teams I have studied range from seed-stage, where there’s usually just an idea, to early-stage, functioning startups, to more successful ones that are moving into growth-stage. The majority of them come from the perspective of having an initial idea or a domain or market in which they want to solve a problem. These typically fall into the quadrant that is more focused on diffusion and incremental innovation—the space where Lean is dominant. A smaller subset have created a new technology, often in school, and want to find a market for it. These tend to fall into the vision-driven startup quadrant, in which there is a more radical innovation, but diffusion tends to be limited. Both of these groups face challenges to realizing disruptive innovation with their products, but, as discussed, these categories are fluid, and with the right tools and methods, startups can focus on moving toward more radical innovation… or toward more widespread diffusion (Figure 2). And both of these can be done through developing a broader understanding of embedded meanings and focusing on how new meanings can be developed.

02

Developing Meaningful Solutions – While all startups initially begin with, at minimum, a general product idea, most have done little, if any, research into the context of the potential user. Some founders come from backgrounds in which they have market knowledge or domain expertise, giving them some level of insight. But in most startups, the conception of research is barely on their radar, and that which is, is rooted in Lean methodology. That is, it is focused on validating the idea with early adopters, developing an MVP, and testing it, not learning about user needs as a starting point or for greater context. “Social proof” –what other people think is correct– is a major goal, rather than really understanding the user. This is an issue rooted in the larger, Lean structure as well as the funding mechanisms. There is a lack of focus in Lean on doing any sort of in depth research. And where some level of research activity is found, it is often boiled down to understanding whether and how early adopters use a product. These studies are typically conducted through reductionist tools, such as Crazyegg heat maps; Mixpanel, and Heap for cohort analysis; tools for funnel analytics; and A/B testing platforms, like Optimizely and Google Analytics. These are often supplemented by some interviews with actual users (early adopters) or cold calling potential would-be users. Beyond those forms, doing research with users and interpreting meaning from users’ perspectives is something generally left out of the picture. And while some of these products diffuse and have solid metrics, there’s often no understanding of why.

One such example of this is Molome, a Thailand-based team I followed at JFDI, an accelerator in Singapore. Molome’s product was initially a sticker app for photos that had grown viral globally, in the days before apps with similar capabilities, like Snapchat. They had incredible signup numbers—in the millions—and were incredibly successful not only in Thailand, but also in Indonesia and in Brazil. But they didn’t know why. The Lean process led them down a path of experimentation… but it never helped them gain any enlightened understanding of what was meaningful about the product to users. They ultimately shifted their product to a meme-generator and folded soon after.

On the flip side this conundrum of having successful diffusion and not knowing why is the me-too product conundrum. For every successful idea, there are scores of copycat products. And, often those copycats are taking an idea that has been successful in one place, like Silicon Valley, and trying to replicate in another region. Aventones, a Chilean startup I followed at NXTP, an accelerator in Buenos Aires, is a good example. Aventones was an online car-pooling system much in the same vein as the original concepts from Uber and Lyft’s predecessor, Zimride. While following the model of some quite successful, disruptive startups, they did not find success themselves. What seems to be lacking was an understanding of how the introduction of this model might present a meaningful change in Chileans lives, where public transportation is safe, efficient, and relatively cheap. And, in following from that, Lean methods didn’t help illuminate how the model might best be adapted to be meaningfully different there.

It seems that particularly in seed-stage startups, which are seeking product-market fit, elements of an ethnographic approach could enable a greater localized understanding of the context or problem space in which a product is being created. As a methodology with a very holistic approach, ethnography seems poised to help new founders gain a deeper view into the context surrounding the potential or nascent product. It would also open up the rigid experimental processes of Lean to more interpretation. Ethnography is an iterative and reflective process that focuses on open-ended questions, as opposed to the fairly rigid, controlled experimental process of Lean. At the front end, it would help in exploring problem spaces, before making hypotheses about them. And as a product develops, ethnographic data provides a deeper level of data on which to base decisions. This need not eclipse the types of data provided by Lean methods. Ethnography embraces both the qualitative and quantitative forms of data. It adds a richer layer of perspective through which to analyze and interpret the quantitative findings. Observing people in all the richness of the context in which they are embedded would not only serve to more thoroughly understand how a product idea might solve any sort of problem, but moreover, what problems there are, how they really matter to people, and, importantly how meaningful the solution might be in people’s lives and interactions. As an approach it serves to interrogate meaning socially, and how that might inform decisions

Mapping Meaning and Interpreting Markets – For other early-stage startups, a major hurdle is that they have created a technology that solves a problem or presents an opportunity, but do not have a clear market for it, so it cannot diffuse widely. Or, they believe they have a market for it, but that market doesn’t embrace it as their vision anticipated. In these instances, the larger issue is less oriented around how meaning might be radically different as a product diffuses in different social settings, and more oriented to understanding how a product that is already radically different might create new meaning for people.

Solapa4, an Argentine team I followed at NXTP, experienced this problem. They had created an algorithm to combine geographic information system (GIS) data sources from satellites. This ostensibly provided a fuller, richer set of data on locations for decision-making in agribusiness, the field in which they felt this would have the most impact. They chose to target crop insurance providers, as they felt their product provided meaningful data to them. It turns out that it is not nearly so meaningful based on the systems of assessing risk in such firms. They have since pivoted and expanded outside of Argentina, but are still in search of making a more meaningful impact in the agricultural domain.

Another team I followed, Scrollback, at JFDI, also faced these challenges. They developed a browser-based Javascript chat tool to replace Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Scrollback is backward-compatible with the open protocol IRC of the past 20 years, which has not seen any major technology innovation through that period. The Scrollback team started with the technology and initially tried to bring on customers from universities, admission offices, online forums, other communities that presently used IRC. But this did not work— they were already used to what they were using. They failed to show how this might be meaningfully different for their users.

In both of these instances, another factor to consider is the current shift from technology-driven innovation into realms where innovation is more technology-aware. That is to say, the current startup environment is much more oriented toward taking technological advances that have already been developed, and applying them in a new domain. And selecting the right domain, and the right market is key.

Founders who have created a technological innovation without a clear user base in mind need to conduct more in-depth contextual research to identify potential product-market fit. One method of doing this is targeting different markets in the fashion of Lean, and seeing what gets traction. But immediate traction doesn’t give insight into how and why something is used– why it would be a good solution for this market. Doing this type of research has implications for the product aims and the user groups that are –or could be focused on, which could be particularly valuable for smaller, marginalized, or otherwise neglected groups. For both founders who don’t know their potential market, and even those who do believe they know their market, there is value in an ethnographic approach, which emphasizes both an etic and an emic approach—giving them a broader perspective, and also getting an situated understanding from the user perspective. For founders who don’t know their potential market, but have done some basic research into it, an emic perspective would help reveal the perspective from the point of view of the user.

Once a startup experiences some success and moves into a growth stage, they are focused on expanding and adapting an established startup product to different markets. Here, ethnographic approaches can help in adapting successful solutions or new technologies to other markets. As noted, some founders come in with local knowledge –often deep, detailed knowledge, and a perspective that drove them to solve a problem. They may have a strong emic perspective in that instance. But then, to grow, they need to gain an emic perspective in a different culture and understand how the society and culture are changing as well. Doing deeper research into other potential markets, while taking an etic perspective to the product vision overall would help to project a more meaningful analysis of the space and allow the founders to step back and reflect on their initial market goals.

Limitations of the Current Model

Resources, Access, and Skills – The potential for ethnographic research to aid in startup innovation is great, but the challenge is how startups access such resources or develop necessary skills. Startups are particularly cash-strapped and scrappy by nature, so they are unlikely to have resources to bring in dedicated researchers or consult research contractors before they are well into the growth stage. Through various networks and programs like accelerators, startups are able to learn many new skills and develop and expand their competencies, so there is some potential for gaining some skills in ethnographic research approaches. But, in reality, the networks of mentors and advisors such programs curate typically come from business-oriented or technology-oriented backgrounds, not the realms of design, UX, or any sort of research, for that matter. Thus, they have little access to the knowledge or resources to help them expand these skills. And those resources and mentors they do have access to generally encourage the current model and Lean methodologies, which reinforces using the aforementioned tools, which are representative of the sort of deskilling of labor in research and UX work, much like Lombardi (2009) described in relation to ethnographic work in the private sector. While there is an opportunity to extend the ethnographic community into the realm of startups, it seems that the current model of funding and prioritization of diffusion are still major barriers.

Moving Beyond the Folk Model – The potential opportunities for ethnographic methods in startups is tremendous. Ethnographic research would indeed be transformative for many startups in terms of developing more meaningful, innovative products. But aside from being unlikely to make inroads given the current approaches and dominant model, it also doesn’t push the needle very far beyond the dominant folk model that exists in corporate ethnography. Ethnographic research in corporations functions much the same way as outlined here—finding a new area in which to develop a product, exploring new markets, providing richer data and a more dynamic understanding of the context, and interpreting meaning. Ethnographic research within startups would be necessarily different from corporate ethnography in many ways, and it would certainly have different sorts of impacts terms of helping startups find and develop new, innovative paths to take. Yet, it still is not too far removed from the folk model. By contrast, a much more compelling, innovative path for ethnographic research to explore – and one which would also have a tremendous impact on startups—would seem to be in forging new paths in venture capital.

PATHMAKING: ETHNOGRAPHIC POTENTIAL IN VENTURE CAPITAL

The current state of innovation coming out of Silicon Valley and other tech hubs seems lacking to many. Many of the products and services emerging at the moment seem to be frivolous, indulgent or navel-gazing; they reflect a focus on Silicon Valley. Recent commentary on the topic suggests the goals of these “innovations” are basically to provide for themselves everything that their mothers no longer do” (Arieff 2016). Not only are women and minorities underrepresented (Whitney & Ames 2014), there is an “echo chamber” that creates a closed system in terms of what is considered novel, useful, or innovative. In short, the products aren’t very meaningful for many people. The reasons are myriad. There’s a focus on potential for diffusion above all else, leading to large bets placed on what the next “unicorn” will be. And those bets tend to come in waves that follow the latest trends projected from Silicon Valley thought leaders, not any sort of meaningful, systematic analyses.

While ethnography holds great potential in helping startups find new paths, as we’ve just discussed, the much more fruitful potential seems to be in guiding funders down new paths. After all, they play an outsized role in deciding what succeeds or fails. Venture capital-backed startups in the tech sector have a much higher survival rate than comparable companies (Parhankangas 2012). If ethnographic research has the power to drive truly transformational outcomes in the startup sphere, it is by helping identify new horizons and forging new paths for venture capital, who in turn shape the startups themselves.

A Pathology of Venture Capital

How VC Works – Access to capital is especially important at all stages, but especially the seed stage of a technology venture, and Silicon Valley provides the most VC funding globally (Kramer & Patrick 2014). This funding occurs through established VC firms and corporate VC arms, as well as through wealthy individuals known as “angel investors.” The origins of this began in the 1950s, when “The Group,” a small network of young investors began pooling investments in technology-focused startups in Palo Alto, becoming key players in the growth of the VC community there (Kenney 2000). By the 1970s, successes had spurred greater investment, and successful entrepreneurs started to become venture capitalists after exiting, organically creating the “virtuous cycle” of capital funding in Silicon Valley. This continues today, with examples such as the PayPal Mafia, a group of former PayPal employees who went on to invest in (and found) many other successful startups (Lacy 2008).

This virtuous cycle explains why there is so much more seed capital available in Silicon Valley than other places, where people tend to put money in stocks, bonds, real estate, or other more stable ventures. VC investments are notoriously risky, with average returns well underperforming other investment vehicles (Huntsman & Hoban 1980). Entrepreneurs-cum-investors, however, tend to have a higher risk tolerance, which in theory helps spur innovation at a much higher rate than corporate R&D (Kaplan & Lerner 2015). According to previous research, VC tolerance for failure help startups “overcome early difficulties and realize their innovative potential” (Tian & Wang 2011). VC firms bridge the gap between entrepreneurs and financiers, dealing with “moral hazard” and asymmetric information (Lerner & Tag 2013). They screen startups, create contracts, stage funding, and closely monitor and often advise the startups they fund. But the way they make money underlies some of the main challenges the startup world is facing.

Venture capitalists make money through financial engineering. They find companies that are undervalued, that have great potential for increasing in value dramatically. They invest at a low price, and eventually aim to sell stocks at a high price as the company garners more investment, grows, and possibly exits – getting acquired or going public. Other, recent changes to structuring capital have also enabled angels to make more investments. Convertible notes enable them to invest in the form of a loan that converts to equity once another round of funding is raised (Feld & Mendelson 2011). This encourages investing in very early rounds, when the valuation of a startup is uncertain and unstable. About 80% of a VC funds’ returns come from 20% of it’s investments (Rachleff, 2014). Increasingly, for investors, it is a “home run” game. They depend on outliers, investments with the potential for extreme returns within five years, usually larger than ten times the initial investment. Essentially, VC funds make lots of small bets in hopes that one will become the next “unicorn” among the likes of Google, Facebook, or Uber. This also means that a lot of those investments fail. In fact, VC funds earn capital gains from only a small portion of their portfolio companies; typically, more that 75% of investments are written off (Hochberg et al 2007). Exits from only a very small percentage of top companies are what drive returns for the majority of the VC industry (CB Insights 2015).

The funds typically range from $50 million to $100 million for seed-stage focus and $100 million to $500 million for later-stage startup investment, with a 10-year lifespan. Partners who manage a VC fund make money from managing these funds in two ways. First, they typically charge 2% of a fund in management fees, so managing a $100 million fund garners them $2 million over 10 years, or about $200k a year. They also make 20% carry— 20% of the profit from the fund. This structure incentivizes them to raise and manage multiple funds simultaneously, and allows them to lock in high levels of personal income, even if they fail to return investment capital to the limited partners who invest in the fund (Mulcahy et al 2012). There is also pressure to deploy at least a third of a fund within the first 3 years of its 10-year cycle so that returns can be realized during the lifetime of the fund. This means there is a rush to make decisions on investing tens of millions of dollars. This rush to make decisions is not good for finding and fostering innovative startups, but notably, it’s also not good for the VC funds themselves..

Challenges for VC – The way VCs are structured, as described above, leads to several major challenges for the VCs themselves. First, there is the virtuous cycle. The fact that many VCs have emerged from successful startup founders themselves means that, yes they have a tolerance for risk and good business insights to a large degree. But that doesn’t provide them broad background and knowledge into domains and markets that they may want to invest in. Second, the structure of trying to get the “home run” investment that counterbalances the others that fail leads to a hunt for “unicorns,” or at least trends following in the footsteps of unicorns. While some VCs have overarching theses around how they aim to invest and there is some level of due diligence before selecting startups, there are no methods, broadly speaking, for doing things in a systematic way. And, importantly, the pressure to deploy exacerbates things. Most invested capital needs to be deployed in the first few years of a 10-year fund cycle, leading to rushed decision-making. This rush to find something links back to the issue of the virtuous cycle as well, as VC partners look to entrepreneurs they know to find something fast. This stifles funding for truly innovative emerging startups who may lack connections.

But beyond stifling innovation, and more to the bottom-line for investors, VCs in general just don’t perform well for the risk they entail. VCs have not out-performed the public market. In fact, a recent study showed that only 20 of 100 funds generated returns that performed 3% better than the public market; the average VC fund fails to make a return on investor capital (Mulcahy et al 2012). Between 2004 and 2014, venture capital as an asset class only slightly out-performed the S&P 500, with an average annual return of 8.1%, compared to 5.7% (Cambridge Associates, 2013). In general, this performance is mostly accounted for by the top performing firms like Andreesen Horowitz, Accel, Benchmark, Greylock, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, Sequoia, Union Square, and Y Combinator. The top approximately 20 VC firms, account for 95% of the return in the industry (Rachleff, 2014). The others struggle to have the same sorts of networks to source the best startups.

In short, returns are unsatisfactory industry-wide, and venture capital underperforms as an asset class (Kedrosky 2009).

To put things bluntly, as Josh Kopelman, a well-known venture capitalist did: “[F]or an industry that funds innovation – it really doesn’t have that much” (Griffith 2013). In part, this seems due to the lack of structure and of systematic processes within the VC community. While some of the top VC firms have specific theses about the way they will invest or the domains in which they are keen to follow trends, much of the decision making relies on thought leadership and connections. But beyond these informed opinions, there are no general systems or methods for exploring potential domains, finding startups and making decisions on funding them. It seems that it may well be of interest to utilize research more adeptly within these funds, and to have a more meaningful process. VC partners have the capital available to subsidize research, and the returns from having a more informed and thoughtful process would be worth the investment, especially. It seems that incorporating ethnographic thinking and research would be a step toward creating a more innovative VC model, which in turn could fund more innovative startups and hopefully foster more sustainable ones.

A More Meaningful, Ethnographic Approach

There are several overarching challenges for the VC model– in identifying areas of opportunity and trends, and in finding, funding, and fostering more innovative startups.

Identifying areas of opportunity is often based on hunches, rather than research. And in particular, there is a lack of knowledge about different markets globally and burgeoning areas that are spreading tech innovations into other domains and industries and markets. In finding new startups– what’s known as “deal flow”– one of the biggest challenges is that VC firms rely on their internal knowledge and connections rather than solid ideas, and decisions are usually reactionary and informed by a herd mentality. Making decisions around funding startups usually centers on hollow metrics. While there is a level of due diligence, the data sources are not great and lead to funding startups that may not truly be innovative. And finally, fostering startups tends to be an afterthought, particularly in looking at broader impact, values, and sustainability. VC investment controls what startups succeed in large part, so these issues are paramount to fostering innovation in the startup world.

[/s2If]

  1 comment for “Meaningful Innovation: Ethnographic Potential in the Startup and Venture Capital Spheres

  1. Great article 🙂 I’m concerned about this phrase though :”…and allows them to lock in high levels of personal income, even if they fail to return investment capital to the limited partners who invest in the fund (Mulcahy et al 2012)”
    Carriest interest is only earned by GP/VCs when the fund they are managing, performs above mere investor capital return, hurdle included.,(hurdle being the investors (LPs) minimum expected return in terms of IRR ( Internal Rate of Return)).
    So no VC can earn carried before having started to make a profit, unless there is a flaw in the fund’s LPA (Limited Partnership agreement)

Leave a Reply